


Situational Awareness in detecting Fraud or Financial Crime

Dr Andrew Lenaghan,
Information security officer / consultant

An example...

\$30,000 in A.T.M. withdrawals in 6h (Manhattan NY)



- | | | | |
|----------|---|-----------|---|
| 1 | 
4.31pm
4:31PM - @ 2380 BROADWAY
5 WITHDRAWALS- \$4,015 | 2 | 
5:10PM - @ 2077 BROADWAY
3 WITHDRAWALS- \$2,409 |
| 3 | 
5:28PM - @ 1886 BROADWAY
3 WITHDRAWALS- \$2,409 | 4 | 
6:17PM - @ 1680 BROADWAY
3 WITHDRAWALS- \$2,409 |
| 5 | 
6:24PM - @ 1535 BROADWAY
3 WITHDRAWALS- \$2,409 | 6 | 
6:43PM - @ 515 SEVENTH AVE
3 WITHDRAWALS- \$2,409 |
| 7 | 
7:31PM - @ 238 EIGHTH AVE
3 WITHDRAWALS- \$2,409 | 8 | 
8:55PM - @ 919 THIRD AVE
3 WITHDRAWALS- \$2,409 |
| 9 | 
9:24PM - @ 991 THIRD AVE
7 WITHDRAWALS- \$5,621 | 10 | 
9:55pm
9:55PM - @ 1191 THIRD AVE
4 WITHDRAWALS- \$4015 |

Prepaid card ATM heist 2013

[1][2]

Scale - \$45m (£29m) across 26 countries.

- ◆ Inc. law enforcement agencies in US, Japan, Canada, the UK, Romania +12 other countries
- ◆ Seven charged in New York


How

◆ Hackers

- ◆ compromise computer systems of card processors to steal data on prepaid debit cards
- ◆ Manipulated withdrawal limits on cards
- ◆ distributed card information to accomplices aka "cashers" around the world

◆ Cashers

- ◆ loaded stolen info onto magnetic stripe cards
- ◆ used cloned card to make cash withdrawals at ATMs



March - Elvis Rafael Rodriguez, left, and Emir Yasser Yeje, charged with ML in Brooklyn (with \$40,000)

← Not caught

← 1 US Gang caught

Two attacks



Attacks

1: December 2012

Issuer: Rakbank
(United Arab Emirates)

- ◆ Network intrusion into Indian credit card processor
- ◆ Increase limits on 5 prepaid cards issued by Rakbank
- ◆ Overall
 - ◆ casher cells execute 4,500 ATM transactions
 - ◆ in about 20 countries
 - ◆ Obtained \$5m

2: Feb 2013 – x8 more costly

Issuer: Bank of Muscat
(Oman)

- ◆ Network intrusion into US credit card processor
- ◆ Obtained details and increased limits on 12 prepaid accounts
- ◆ Overall
 - ◆ casher cells executed 36,000 ATM transactions
 - ◆ in 24 countries
 - ◆ worth \$40m (<24h hours)


What is know about the NY cashing crew?

- ◆ Structured : Leader + 7 named associates
- ◆ Equipment & technical ability : modest
 - ◆ able to receive card details via internet
 - ◆ clone details on to mag. stripe to create fake cards
- ◆ Planning / execution - good
 - ◆ Short duration of attacks, coordinate internationally
 - ◆ Hundreds / thousand transactions conducted with hours
- ◆ What did they do with the proceeds (\$2.7m)?
 - ◆ Cash recovered – \$60K
 - ◆ Money banked – \$100k in 2 accounts
 - ◆ Buy Rolex oyster perpetual watches


Financial Crime

- ◆ Adversarial environment
 - ◆ victim / attacker - both have awareness
- ◆ Crime types - financial
 - ◆ Fraud – obtaining good and service by deception
 - ◆ Money laundering– handling the proceeds of crime
- ◆ Well defined underground marketplace and roles for financial information

Situational awareness model (Endsley)



Who might be aware of financial crime?




1. Law enforcement

- ◆ Local police forces
 - ◆ Tend not to have high tech capabilities.
 - ◆ Capabilities do exist– eg UK's National Cyber Crime Unit part of the National Crime Agency (NCA) - limited
 - ◆ (Consumer more likely to contact payment service provider or merchant to resolve crime).
- ◆ Money laundering reporting in the financial sector
 - ◆ Compulsory Role: money laundering reporting officer
 - ◆ File **Suspicious activity reports (SARs)**

UK Fraud reporting : data sources

[3]



2. Financial sector / merchants

- ◆ **Perception**

- ◆ more information / more quickly at hand

- ◆ **Comprehension**

- ◆ Dedicated fraud teams / investigators
- ◆ Fraud detection systems :
 - ◆ Threshold
 - ◆ Rules / pattern matching to identify anomalous transaction
 - ◆ IP geo-location / device fingerprinting / stolen card lists
- ◆ Industry typologies of know threats (indicators, actors)

- ◆ **Projection**

- ◆ 'Risk based' approach
- ◆ Risky transaction – blocked or subject to more stringent checks

3. Individuals (consumers)

- ◆ Low awareness of threat / attack
- ◆ **Perception** : May not spot warning signs
 - ◆ Phishing attacks often cunning
- ◆ **Comprehension**
 - ◆ Often unaware they have been targeted until merchants / payment service providers contact them.
- ◆ **Projection**
 - ◆ Unsure what to do / lacking technical capability to deal with threat.

Future trends...

Two Challenges...

- ◆ Alternative currencies
 - ◆ Eg Bitcoin
 - ◆ Bring cash like anonymity to payment
- ◆ Network Anonymisation technologies
 - ◆ Eg Tor networking
 - ◆ Hide src/dst

Both make it harder to trace money or identify end points.

Two Opportunities...

- ◆ Strong (2F) Authentication for payment
- ◆ Mandate better communication / education from payment service providers about the threats consumer face

(Coming from EBA European banking authority – guidelines on security of internet payments)

References

- [1] Santora M 9/5/2013, NY Times, *In Hours, Thieves Took \$45 Million in A.T.M. Scheme*
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/nyregion/eight-charged-in-45-million-global-cyber-bank-thefts.html>
- [2] BBC News, 10/5/2013 *Cybercriminals 'drained ATMs' in \$45m world bank heist*
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22470299>
- [3] Office for National Statistics, **User Guide to Crime Statistics for England and Wales**,
January 2015, p.53