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On Demand for Situational Awareness for Preventing Attacks on the Smart Grid

Thoughts on how situational awareness might help to secure critical energy infrastructures
A small piece of the EU – FP7 project: ECOSSIAN

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Outline

- Motivation and purpose
- Changes in energy infrastructure
- Challenges and problems of those changes
- Threats and need for state awareness
- Mitigation approaches
 - ◆ Traditional security by design
 - ◆ ECOSSIAN approach over situational awareness

Motivation

- Purpose of this paper:
 - ◆ Raising awareness regarding new threats to electrical energy infrastructure
 - ◆ New capabilities of the smart grid approach must be accompanied by security and not only safety aspects
- Not provided:
 - ◆ Detailed description of energy infrastructure
 - ◆ Detailed description of imminent threats

Changes in infrastructure

- Traditional generation
 - ◆ Discrete number of Coal and nuclear power plants distributed across europe
- Traditional distribution
 - ◆ From plants over high and medium voltage distribution lines to customers
 - ◆ Last sensing units are deployed on medium to low voltage transformation

Smart Grid approach

- Comprehensive communication infrastructure
- Local generation as well as traditional generation
- Storages (in chemical, potential, physical energy form)
- Virtual power plants as connection from generation, storage, consumption in a region
- Dynamic load management and dynamic pricing of electrical energy
- Stochastic effects in generation planning and operation because of renewable sources

Challenges

- Safety infrastructure components must be interconnected due to distributed generation
- Renewable(stochastic) generation poses the need of further simulation onto the grid operators
- Simulation inputs consists of broad knowledge of grid state i.e. sensor values on every level(even low voltage)

Smart Grid

- Smart meters for consumption measurement
- Inverters or small transformer stations for power generation sensing and control
- Interconnected protection devices
- Load management devices in private consumer space
- Gateways to existing grid control infrastructures.
- Central control centres as data concentrators of the sensing units

Possible attack on SG infrastructure

- Multiphase attack with highlighted parts where situational awareness might help to prevent a blackout
- Phase 1 *Attacking the grid control center*
- Phase 2 *Attacking smart power generators*

Attacking the grid control center

- 1. Obtain technical documentation on targeted smart meters, communication channels and protocols used.
- 2. **Obtain physical access to smart meters.** Conduct reverse engineering of available smart meters or test them for vulnerabilities known to the attacker.
- 3. **Connect to the communication medium** between a functioning smart meter and its data concentrator.
- 4. Decrypt signals sent by smart meters by sniffing their communication with a data concentrator.

Attacking the grid control center

- 5. Simulate a smart meter to a data concentrator. **Send malicious signals to the concentrator.**
- 6. Establish a foothold in the concentrator: execute malicious code on it, **obtain limited or full control over the concentrator.**
- 7. Begin communicating with the grid control center on behalf of the concentrator, or inject malicious input into their communication.
- 8. Run or plant malicious software on the control center server, possibly obtain limited or full control over it using known vulnerabilities.

Attacking smart power generators

- Obtain documentation on smart grid structure and power lines architecture in the targeted regions.
- **Engineer a tariff update message that sets a very low price for received power.**
- Distribute the fake tariff among consumer tariff management devices. Consumers start perceiving the current energy prices as very low and the power demand raises.
- Using the provider control center's resources, the attacker commands **all available small-scale energy generators to stop feeding power to the grid.**
- Due to the high demand the grid becomes instable.

Traditional Security by Design

- Even if this should be obvious the components in critical infrastructures should follow good Security by Design guidelines
- For smart grid components:
 - ◆ Separation on actuation from sensing units
 - ◆ Actuation only on commands from multiple sources
 - ◆ Encryption and verification of commands
 - ◆ Avoidance of real-time-clocks where possible
 - ◆ Strategies to change credentials

ECOSSIAN project approach

- ECOSSIAN -**E**uropean **C**ontrol **S**ystem **S**ecurity **I**ncident **A**nalysis **N**etwork(FP7)
- Detection, analysis and mitigation of threats to critical infrastructure on company/national/european level
- Interconnected situational awareness enables more complex analysis, forecasting and prevention of attacks
- See <http://www.ecossian.eu>

Conclusion

- Traditional security by design approaches in device development might not be sufficient if connected infrastructure is compromised
- Situational awareness at all levels enables complex analyses to detect misbehaviour of infrastructure, even if single decisions, states or commands seem plausible

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